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IntroduCtIon: It’s not only the south
There is sometimes the misconception that microsegregation only 
persists in the South given that segregation was historically entrenched 
in the South.1  However, judicially-sanctioned microsegregation goes 
1 See generally Erica Frankenberg, Assessing the Status of School Desegregation Sixty 
Years after Brown, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 677 (2014); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and 
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back as far as 1849 when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
authorized school-level segregation in ruling that school officials have 
absolute authority to “arrange, classify, and distribute pupils, in such a 
manner as they think best adapted to their general proficiency and wel-
fare.”2  The Supreme Court of Indiana held similarly:
[T]he placing of the white children of the State in one class and 
the negro children of the State in another class, and requiring 
these classes to be taught separately, provision being made for 
their education in the same branches, according to age, capaci-
ty, or advancement, with capable teachers . . . does not amount 
to a denial of equal privileges to either, or conflict with the 
open character of the system required by the constitution.3
The Court of Appeals of New York unconscionably opined, in dis-
regard of minorities rights, that:
If the right, therefore, of school authorities to discriminate, in 
the exercise of their discretion, as to the methods of education 
to be pursued with different classes of pupils be conceded, how 
can it be argued that they have not the power, in the best inter-
ests of education, to cause different races and nationalities, 
whose requirements are manifestly different, to be educated 
in separate places.4
Moreover, we know that, “[i]n the years immediately following 
legally mandated desegregation in the South, for example, some districts 
Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1597 (2003); 
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding and Reme-
dying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 787 
(2010) (discussing Southern segregation).
2 Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 208 (1849).  In these times, courts trivialized 
and dismissed minorities’ desegregation suits as requests based on gratification of feelings. 
See, e.g., People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 442 (1883) (“The relator, however, com-
plains, not but that she is receiving the highest educational advantages that the city is capable 
of giving her, but that she is not receiving those facilities at the precise place which would be 
the most gratifying to her feelings.”).  See also id. at 451–52 (“It is quite impracticable for the 
authorities to take into account and provide for the gratification of the taste”).  Courts resisted 
calls to use laws to redress even valid constitutional concerns while preferring to give priority 
to the sentiment of the majority culture.  See id. at 448 (“but this end can neither be accom-
plished nor promoted by laws which conflict with the general sentiment of the community 
upon whom they are designed to operate.”).
3 Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 362 (1874).  The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled likewise.  See 
The State, ex rel. Garnes, v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 211 (1871).
4 Gallagher, 93 N.Y. at 449–50.
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actually separated students by race using classroom partitions and segre-
gated lunchrooms.”5
This Article is an epilogue to our Article “Riding the Plessy Train: 
Reviving Brown For A New Civil Rights Era For Micro-Desegregation” 
published in the Chicana/o Latina/o Law Review.  This Article exam-
ines micro-desegregation in the lower courts.  It presents instances of the 
limited lower court micro-desegregation victories as well as lower court 
rulings that can serve as exemplars.  The Article also discusses and cri-
tiques disappointing lower court rulings.  It argues that there must be a 
continuing duty to desegregate as some lower courts have acknowledged. 
Furthermore, it calls on the Supreme Court and other lower courts to 
forcefully enforce this duty to ensure complete micro-desegregation. 
The final Part points out that time is of the essence for minorities in low-
er tracks and beckons the judiciary to act promptly to provide redress.  It 
also suggests some principles for school districts and the judiciary for a 
consequential micro-desegregation era.
If the judiciary is, in truth, a “defender of minority rights” and 
“avant-garde in social justice struggles”6, it is imperative that it carry on 
this banner to fight this enduring bastion of school segregation.  Under 
this civil rights era, desegregation must be mandated, “not because it will 
necessarily improve pupils’ scores in the three R’s, but because the Con-
stitution requires it.”7
I. trACkIng In the lower Courts
A. Railroad Cars are not Free When you are Excluded From all but One
Even in 1880, shades of tracking could be found in various places 
including the City of Ottawa (Kansas) where a school district committee 
5 Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd, & Jacob L. Vigdor, Segregation and Resegregation 
in North Carolina’s Public School Classrooms, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1463, 1467 (2003); Kenneth J. 
Meier, Joseph Stewart, Jr., & Robert E. England, Race, Class, and Education: The Politics 
of Second-Generation Discrimination 123 (1989).  This is sadly not shocking given that, as 
Justice Brennan once observed, “[a]fter enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment the States 
continued to deny Negroes equal educational opportunity, enforcing a strict policy of segrega-
tion that itself stamped Negroes as inferior, that relegated minorities to inferior educational 
institutions, and that denied them intercourse in the mainstream of professional life necessary 
to advancement.”  Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 371 (1978) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
6 Richard Thompson Ford, Brown’s Ghost, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1305, 1305 (2004).
7 Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, New York Sch. Dist. No. 21, 383 F. Supp. 699, 747 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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recommended “the colored children in rooms Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
be placed in the same school house, and a teacher of their own color 
be employed to instruct them; and that they be advanced into rooms 
Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 as fast as they make suitable proficiency, and 
in the same manner as the whites.”8  That district zealously defended its 
microsegregation policy and practices to the Supreme Court of Kansas:
[T]he board has seen fit to direct that to certain of these rooms 
and teachers the white children of six primary grades shall 
go, and to a certain other room and to an equally competent 
teacher the colored children of these grades shall go.  Where is 
the exclusion?  Is it that all teachers and rooms are not equally 
accessible to them?  They are not to the white children.  Is it 
that certain rooms and teachers are not equally open to them?  
Neither are they to the white children.  In every large graded 
school, pupils of exactly the same qualifications are arbitrarily 
separated and placed in different rooms.  Yet no one thinks of 
calling that exclusion. . . .  The board has said in its discretion 
that it is best to educate the races separately.9
The district rationalized its microsegregation practices with the disingen-
uous racial asymmetry argument that there was no constitutional foul 
because White students similarly did not necessarily have access to the 
minority classes.10  As evident above, the district also eagerly endorsed 
arbitrary student assignments.  Thankfully, even then in the 1880s, the 
Supreme Court of Kansas recognized that students of all races should 
mingle and learn together because that represents our “great world in 
miniature.”11  The court appropriately held that “railroad cars are not 
free to a person who is excluded from all but one of them; and, on the 
8 Bd. of Educ. of City of Ottawa v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1, 2 (1881).
9 Id. at 4–6 (emphasis added).  Similarly, the Supreme Court of California could not have 
been more wrong when it stated that “in the circumstances that the races are separated in the 
public schools, there is certainly to be found no violation of the constitutional rights of the 
one race more than of the other, and we see none of either, for each, though separated from 
the other, is to be educated upon equal terms with that other, and both at the common public 
expense.”  Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 52 (1874).
10 See Tinnon, 26 Kan. at 10–11 (presenting plaintiff’s forceful condemnation of this dis-
trict argument).
11 Id. at 19.
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same principle, schools are not free to a person who is excluded from all 
but one of them.”12
B. Limited Micro-Desegregation Victories
Since that Kansas case, successful challenges to tracking have been 
sparse and even then very difficult to realize.13  One case where such a 
challenge proved successful is United States v. Yonkers.14  In that case, 
the United States District Court, Southern District of New York found 
that minorities were significantly underrepresented in honors, advanced 
placement and college-bound tracks of the Yonkers Public Schools’ 
tracking program.15  While White students made up 81.82 percent of 
these top tracks, Hispanics made up only 7.58 percent and African Amer-
icans 9.09 percent.16  In addition, the court found that “[o]ver the entire 
ten-year period studied, white students were 2 to 3 times more likely 
than minority students to be awarded a Regents diploma.”17
The court acknowledged that, even when segregative practices are 
not driven by intentional discrimination, discrimination can be embed-
ded in district policies and practices.18  The court found that the placement 
tests as well as the teacher expectations led to the racial disparities in 
12 Id. at 21.
13 For instance, in 1994, forty years after Brown I, the United States District Court, Eastern 
District of Arkansas, pointed out that “[t]here is no precedent in the Eighth Circuit on the 
questions presented herein with respect to ability grouping.”  Simmons on Behalf of Simmons 
v. Hooks, 843 F.Supp. 1296, 1301 (E.D. Ark. 1994).  See also e.g., United States v. Gregory- 
Portland Indep. Sch. Dist., 654 F.2d 989, 1004 (5th Cir. 1981), Hannon, 506 F.Supp. at 833–78, 
Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. State of Ga., 775 F.2d 1403, 1408–16 (11th 
Cir. 1985), Castaneda by Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 462–63 (5th Cir. 1986) (dismissive 
of microsegregation and bias claims).  Cf. Hart, 383 F.Supp. at 706–57.
14 United States v. Yonkers, 123 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
15 Id. at 716–18.
16 Id. at 717.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 713–15, 717.  See id. at 717–18 (“It is not suggested, by any party that the ap-
parent disparity in the types of courses taken by minority and non-minority students reflects 
any intentional segregation on the part of officials associated with the YPS[Yonkers Public 
Schools] . . .  However, we nevertheless find that the academic tracking reflected in Dr. Wein-
berger’s data is the result of segregative policies and practices.”).  Further, as the Supreme 
Court has stated, even when intent is considered, “[a]dherence to a particular policy or prac-
tice, with full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence upon racial imbalance 
in a school system is one factor among many others which may be considered by a court in 
determining whether an inference of segregative intent should be drawn.”  Columbus Bd. of 
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979).  See also Hart, 383 F.Supp. at 734 (“a school board, 
like other legal entities, must be held accountable for the natural, foreseeable, and avoidable 
consequences of its activities and policies.”).
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the various tracks.19  As the court stated, they fueled the “myth that 
white is smart or only white people can be smart which results in further 
entrenchment of segregative tracking practices.”20  The court concluded 
that the lower teacher expectations for minorities in turn led students 
to have low expectations of themselves and low self-esteem.21  Despite 
the absence of intentional discrimination, the court declared that these 
practices were “vestiges of segregation and must be remedied.”22  This 
is a good model for the Supreme Court to use in enforcing micro-de-
segregation given that the court refused to slight or dismiss the genuine 
inequity concerns of minority students simply based on the artificial con-
struct of intent.
Hobson v. Hansen is the most expansive lower court ruling against 
microsegregation.23  In the case, the United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Columbia ordered abolition of the District of Columbia Public 
Schools’ tracking system.24  The court exposed the district’s alarming 
impetus for the tracking system as resistance to desegregation: “[T]here 
is no escaping the fact that the track system was specifically a response 
to problems created by the sudden commingling of numerous education-
ally retarded Negro students with the better educated white students.”25 
What’s more, the court denunciated the district tests used for track 
assignments.26  The court found it a significant fallacy that the tests 
were principally standardized on White students with no relation to the 
minority experience.27  It was thus inevitable that the tests resulted in 
minorities’ assignment to lower tracks and Whites to upper tracks.28  In 
addition, teacher judgments about students’ abilities could be erroneous 
and very damaging to students placed in the lower tracks.29  This “trag-
edy of misjudgments” could lead minorities to self-fulfilling prophecies 
19 Yonkers, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
20 Id. (internal citations omitted).
21 Id. at 722.
22 Id. at 722.
23 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
24 Id. at 407, 494, 511–15.  The court concluded that the district’s tracking system was racial-
ly “tainted.”  Id. at 443.
25 Hobson, 269 F.Supp. at 442.  See also id. at 443 (“It was the discovery of this large num-
ber of academically retarded Negro children in the school system that led to the institution of 
the track system.”).
26 Hobson, 269 F.Supp. at 406–07.
27 Id. at 407, 485, 514.
28 Id. at 407.
29 Id. at 489.
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of the low expectations.30  The court found more “tragedy”31 in the fact 
that, once assigned to the lower tracks, the minority student’s “chance 
of escape is remote.”32  This was very disappointing because “such chil-
dren, so stigmatized by inappropriate aptitude testing procedures, [were] 
denied equal opportunity to obtain the white collar education available 
to the white and more affluent children.”33  Instead, the minority student 
was prepared as a “blue collar” student.34
The court ruled that intent must not be determinative as these 
effects were too substantial to ignore and violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.35  For instance, the court concluded that “there is substantial 
evidence that tracking tends to thin out the number of Negroes in the 
higher curriculum levels, thus redistributing the racial balance in inte-
grated schools—increasing the proportion of Negroes to whites in the 
lower tracks and decreasing that proportion in the upper tracks.”36  As 
the court pointed out, the tracking system failed minority students on 
the promise of equal educational opportunity:
When a student is placed in a lower track, in a very real sense 
his future is being decided for him; the kind of education 
he gets there shapes his future progress not only in school 
but in society in general.  Certainly, when the school system 
30 Id. at 491–92, 514.
31 Id. at 464.
32 Id. at 407, 458, 460, 463–64, 512–13.  See also id. at 463 (“Movement between tracks bor-
ders on the nonexistent.”).
33 Hobson, 269 F.Supp. at 407, 494.  See also id. at 492 (“By consigning students to specif-
ically designated curricula, the track system makes highly visible the student’s status within 
the school structure.  To the unlearned, tracks can become pejorative labels, symptomatic of 
which is the recent abandonment of the suggestive ‘Basic’ for the more euphemistic ‘Special 
Academic’ as the nomenclature of the lowest track.  And even if a student may be unaware of 
labels, he cannot ignore the physical fact of being separated from his fellow students.”).
34 Hobson, 269 F.Supp. at 407.  See also id. at 515 (“Even in concept the track system is un-
democratic and discriminatory.  Its creator admits it is designed to prepare some children for 
white-collar, and other children for blue-collar, jobs.  Considering the tests used to determine 
which children should receive the blue-collar special, and which the white, the danger of chil-
dren completing their education wearing the wrong collar is far too great for this democracy 
to tolerate.”).
35 Hobson, 269 F.Supp. at 442–43.  The court also found that “at both the elementary and 
junior high school levels the per cent of Negroes enrolled in the lowest track exceeds their 
proportionate representation in the total student body.”  Id. at 456.  “Clearly, then, race cannot 
be considered irrelevant in the operation of the track system.  Even if the effects of tracking 
are not racially motivated, the Negro student nonetheless is affected.”  Id. at 457.
36 Hobson, 269 F.Supp. at 457.
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undertakes this responsibility it incurs the obligation of liv-
ing up to its promise to the student that placement in a lower 
track will not simply be a shunting off from the mainstream of 
education, but rather will be an effective mechanism for bring-
ing the student up to his true potential.  Yet in the District 
the limited scope of remedial and compensatory programs, the 
miniscule number of students upgraded, and the relatively few 
students cross-tracking make inescapable the conclusion that 
existing programs do not fulfill that promise.37
If other courts similarly realized the gravity of the failed promise 
and ordered detracking, many minorities languishing in lower tracks 
might still have the chance at equal educational opportunity.  Recogniz-
ing that racial fears might hinder reform, the court urged the district and 
community to curtail their fears of detracking since micro-desegregation 
need not be detrimental to White students’ education.38
McNeal v. Tate County School District was another paramount low-
er decision as it created the McNeal test which became the analytical 
framework for various subsequent lower court tracking decisions.39  The 
test provides that an otherwise unitary school district can use tracking 
if it shows one of two things: (i) its tracking policies or practices are 
not based on the current effects of past segregation; or (ii) the tracking 
policies or practices will provide better educational opportunities that 
remedy such current results of past segregation.40  As the United States 
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit has ruled, a district that has attained 
unitary status must discontinue its tracking program until the district has 
run a unitary school system for “at least several years” if the program 
has a substantial racial disparate impact.41  Additionally, the court set a 
37 Id. at 473.  See id. at 464 (“cross-tracking is track terminology for electing courses above 
or below an assigned curriculum level.”).
38 Hobson, 269 F.Supp. at 419.
39 McNeal v. Tate Cty. School Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975).  This test from the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, seems to have gained wide acceptance in the lower 
courts.  See, e.g., United States v. Gadsden Cty. Sch. Dist., 572 F.2d 1051, 1052–53 (5th Cir. 1978) 
and Simmons on Behalf of Simmons v. Hooks, 843 F.Supp. 1296, 1302–03 (E.D. Ark. 1994) 
(applying the McNeal test).
40 McNeal, 508 F.2d at 1020.  See Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 490 F.3d 1257, 
1260 (11th Cir. 2007) (characterizing it as the McNeal standard/test).
41 Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. State of Ga., 775 F.2d 1403, 1413 
(11th Cir. 1985).  Accord Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401–02 (5th Cir. 
1971).
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judicial example for micro-desegregation in declaring that “[c]hallenges 
to official action by a local school district which has not achieved unitary 
status can be successful without proof of discriminatory intent.”42
In Simmons on Behalf of Simmons v. Hooks, the plaintiff con-
fronted the racially-disproportionate placement of minorities in special 
education and lower tracks as well as the significant underrepresentation 
of minorities in the gifted and talented track.43  The African American 
mom who filed suit against the Augusta School District No. 10 (Arkan-
sas) alleged that her three children faced discriminatory action through 
placement in lower tracks and special education.44  This mom had also 
faced microsegregation when she was a student, having been assigned 
first to the low ability track and subsequently special education.45  Dis-
trict placements were based on teacher and principal recommendations, 
standardized test scores, and grades.46  The United States District Court, 
Eastern District of Arkansas, found that “[t]he low ability groups have 
a disproportionate number of black students.  The percentage of black 
students in the low ability groups has been as follows in recent years: 
1991–92, 72.1%; 1990–91, 80.9%; 1989–90, 76.6%; 1988–89, 81.6%; 1987–
88, 75.9%; 1986–87, 72.5%.”47
Additionally, the court found that “[t]he percentage of black special 
education students has been as follows in recent years: 1992–93, 62%; 
1991–92, 62%; 1990–91, 61%; 1989–90, 69%; 1988–89, 67%; 1987–88, 
63%. . . . there were twenty-one students identified in the ‘MR’ or ‘men-
tal retardation’ category.  Of these, nineteen were black and two were 
white.”48  The Arkansas Department of Education was so concerned that 
it sent a missive to the district pointing out that the district needed to 
address the fact that the African American special education enrollment 
“exceeded a standard deviation (referring to the difference in percent-
age in special education and percentage of overall student population) 
of 8.3 and was significantly higher than the district’s overall percentages 
of minority students.”49
42 Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1414.
43 Simmons on Behalf of Simmons v. Hooks, 843 F.Supp. 1296, 1297–98 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
44 Id. at 1297–98.
45 Id. at 1297.
46 Id. at 1299.
47 Id. at 1300.
48 Id.
49 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Even though no court had ever granted the district unitary status 
with respect to macrosegregation, the district was an otherwise unitary 
district.50  The court found that the district had done much that could 
qualify it for macrosegregation unitary status; however, the district could 
not be granted unitary status with respect to microsegregation in light 
of the racial disparities in the tracking system.51  Had a court granted 
the district unitary status, the court would have required the plaintiff to 
prove intentional discrimination in order to meet the burden of proof.52 
However, as discussed earlier, the requirement of intent for desegrega-
tion is an imprudent decision.  Fortunately, the court did not entertain 
the intent requirement as an obstacle to ruling for the plaintiff.53
Moreover, as an otherwise unitary district governed by the McNeal 
test, the court concluded that the district’s microsegregation was the 
current effect of past segregation.54  In addition, under the McNeal test, 
the tracking system was not providing better educational opportunities 
to remedy the current effects of past segregation since it stigmatized 
minority students in the low track.55  Even more, the court concluded that 
there was no “credible educational justification” for the district’s low/
high ability tracking system.56  Regrettably, despite this holding regard-
ing the low ability track, the court found no constitutional violation in 
the district’s special education track (despite the segregation therein).57 
The court reasoned that the district had made improvements in special 
50 Id. at 1302.
51 Id. (“the Court cannot hold that the district has achieved unitary status with respect to 
classes.”).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1302, 1304 (“[T]he plaintiff has established by a preponderance of evidence that 
the Augusta School District intended to discriminate against black students when it adopted 
the ability grouping policy that became effective at the same time the dual system terminated. 
The plaintiff’s evidence, which the defendants have not rebutted, shows clearly that the imple-
mentation of the plan resulted in a continuation of racial segregation by class in the low ability 
groups.”).
54 Id. at 1302.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1302–03.  Accord Tonya L. Nelson, Tracking, Parental Education, and Child Lit-
eracy Development: How Ability Grouping Perpetuates Poor Education Attainment within Mi-
nority Communities, 8 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 363, 366 (2001) (observing that “many 
education policy experts, school administrators, and parents question the merits of ability 
grouping generally”).
57 Simmons on Behalf of Simmons, 843 F.Supp. at 1303–04.
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education placements and those placements were based on federal and 
state regulations.58
United States v. Gadsden County School District presented a case 
where tracking placed Whites students in higher tracks and African 
Americans in lower tracks in a district with 78 percent African Amer-
ican enrollment.59  The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 
criticized Gadsden County School District’s (Florida) tracking practices:
Within these five schools, from these statistics, there is simi-
larity of pattern to the extent that the grouping has resulted 
in a concentration of white students in the upper sections 
and black students in the lower levels.  In many instances, the 
upper levels are heavily white, and in other instances, the low-
er sections are all black or virtually all black.60
Pursuant to the McNeal test, the court found that the district adopted 
the tracking system after being ordered to desegregate and so the track-
ing system was a current effect of past segregation.61  There was also 
no evidence that the tracking system would provide better educational 
opportunities that would redress effects of past segregation.62  It was dis-
tressing to find that minorities had no meaningful opportunity to move 
into the upper tracks, cementing the fact that the tracking system would 
not provide better educational opportunities to redress past segrega-
tion’s effects.63
58 Id. at 1303.  The court similarly found no constitutional discrimination in the district’s 
gifted and talented program due to improvements in minority assignments to the program as 
well as the absence of intent to discriminate.  Id.
59 United States v. Gadsden Cty. School Dist., 572 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1978).
60 Id. at 1050.  The statistics the court referenced revealed that, “at Munroe Elementary 
School, which was about 68% Black . . . , 20 of 29 students enrolled in the first section of the 
first grade were white; only 1 of the 24 students enrolled in the fourth section of the first grade 
was white.  At the sixth grade level, 20 of 30 students assigned to the first section were white, 
while only 3 of the 24 students assigned to the fourth section were white.”  Id. at 1051.
61 Gadsden Cty. Sch. Dist., 572 F.2d at 1052–53.  As discussed earlier, many districts adopt-
ed tracking as a way to resist desegregation.  See Harvard Law Review, Teaching Inequality: 
The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1323 (1989) (“Many southern 
school districts adopted tracking as a means of circumventing desegregation orders.  Finally, 
northern cities responded to a large migration of blacks by increasing the amount of ability 
grouping in their systems.”).
62 Gadsden Cty. Sch. Dist., 572 F.2d at 1052–53.
63 Id. at 1052 (“the evidence before the court fails to disclose that, during these past years 
when such grouping has been employed, any meaningful number of students moved upward 
in these group sections, either during the year or from year to year.”).
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Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board is one of the more poi-
gnant microsegregation rulings available.64  In that case, the Tangipahoa 
Parish School District (Louisiana) superintendent incredulously argued 
that “if, in a building housing two first grades, classroom assignments 
resulted in a black first grade and a white first grade, the school would 
in his view be a desegregated school, since it taught children of both 
races.”65  Admirably, the United States District Court, Eastern District of 
Louisiana unequivocally decried this thinking.66  The court righteously 
noted that a “school composed of white classes and black classes is not 
desegregated.  Students must be assigned to classes, even as they must 
be assigned to schools, in a racially nondiscriminatory fashion, and no 
classes may be racially identifiable.”67
Congruently, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, held 
that micro-desegregation must be enforced for the Constitution does not 
require Whites to merely share building facilities with minorities:
It goes without citation that a school board may not direct or 
permit the segregation of students within the classrooms.  If 
this were allowed, a school that was 50% black and 50% white 
might nevertheless have classes that were strictly segregated.  
The Constitution requires substantially more than mere con-
temporaneous use of school facilities.  It requires a unitary 
school system.  Notwithstanding convincing evidence of the 
existence of a pattern of such segregation, the Court below 
declined to issue an injunction because of the assurance of the 
board that such practices were no longer true.  Given the long 
history of opposition to the unitary school concept in Rankin 
County, the Court may no longer accept the verbal assurances 
of the parties that they will comply with the mandate of the 
Constitution.  Accordingly, a mandatory order is required.68
On the contrary, in Morales v. Shannon, the United States Court of 
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, refused to endorse challenge to the Uvalde School 
District’s (Texas) tracking system.69  Instead, the court characterized 
64 Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F.Supp. 244 (E.D. La. 1969).
65 Id. at 249.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 249, 252.
68 Adams v. Rankin Cty. Bd. of Ed., 485 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1973).
69 Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1975).
13
2020] Riding the Plessy Train
the tracking system as “no more than the use of a non-discriminatory 
teaching practice or technique, a matter which is reserved to educators 
under our system of government.”70  The court justified this decision in 
the plaintiff’s failure to provide direct or inferential proof of discrimina-
tion.71  Likewise, the court found no discrimination in the tests, grades, 
and teacher recommendations used for track assignments.72
Similarly, in People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, 
School District # 205,73 the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Cir-
cuit, rebuffed a challenge to the Rockford Board of Education, School 
District # 205’s (Illinois) tracking system.74  This decision is disappointing, 
especially in light of the court’s conclusion that “[t]he well-known cor-
relation between race and academic performance makes tracking, even 
when implemented in accordance with strictly objective criteria . .  . a 
pretty effective segregator.”75  The court egregiously excused the tracking 
system as a valid way to ensure that “better students” stay in the public 
schools.76  Although the court acknowledged tracking resulted in racial 
segregation,77 it disingenuously acted as if the tracking system nonethe-
less offered Latinos and African Americans equal access as Whites to the 
higher tracks:
To abolish tracking is to say to bright kids, whether white or 
black, that they have to go at a slower pace than they’re capa-
ble of; it is to say to the parents of the brighter kids that their 
children don’t really belong in the public school system; and 
it is to say to the slower kids, of whatever race, that they may 
have difficulty keeping up, because the brighter kids may force 
the pace of the class.78
This illusion of access was convenient sophistry the court used to uphold 
the tracking system.  Interestingly, the court did not even realize it was 
70 Id. at 414.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997).  For a very good 
analysis of the People Who Care decisions, see Vanessa G. Tanaka, People Who Care v. Rock-
ford Board of Education and the Spectrum of Race-Conscious Remedies, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 347 
(1999).
74 People Who Care, 111 F.3d at 536.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 535–36.
78 Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
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revealing its sophistry when it then used deficit thinking in stating that 
compensatory education programs are “designed largely although not 
entirely for minority students, because they have on average more edu-
cational deficits.”79
Another case which resulted in an unsuccessful constitutional chal-
lenge to tracking is Holton v. City of Thomasville School District.80  The 
Middle District of Georgia as well as the Eleventh Circuit ruled against 
the African American parents’ challenge to the tracking system in the 
City of Thomasville School District (Georgia);81 despite the fact that the 
tracking system was concededly adopted after termination of de jure 
segregation.82  As discussed earlier, various school districts convenient-
ly chose to introduce tracking after de jure segregation was deemed 
unconstitutional as tracking offered a coy way to maintain segrega-
tion.  Unfortunately, the district and appellate courts did not discern or 
decry this pretense even in the face of judicial acknowledgment that the 
tracking system created racial imbalances.83  Instead, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit saw a sanitized system that relied on standardized tests and teacher 
79 Id. at 538.
80 Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 490 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2007) (Holton II).
81 Thomas Cty. Branch of N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F.Supp.2d 1340 
(M.D. Ga. 2004); Holton II, 490 F.3d at 1259.
82 Holton II, 490 F.3d at 1259.
83 Thomas Cty. Branch of N.A.A.C.P., 299 F.Supp.2d at 1358–59, 1367; Holton v. City of 
Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2005) (Holton I); Holton II, 490 F.3d 
at 1259–60.  In fact, even while acknowledging that many children were still waiting to realize 
the promise of Brown I and Brown II, the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Georgia concluded:
Fifty years ago the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.  
During this golden anniversary year, celebrations, conferences, and sympo-
sia will appropriately commemorate this landmark decision.  Politicians will 
pontificate.  Professors will educate.  Many will reminisce.  Much progress has 
been made.  Legislatures no longer codify racial segregation in the statute 
books.  Governors do not stand in schoolhouse doors.  Black and white chil-
dren share desks, teachers, and water fountains.
Notwithstanding this progress, many poor children are still waiting on the 
promise of Brown—a promise of educational opportunity for every Ameri-
can.  Regrettably, as some of the evidence in this case demonstrates, this prom-
ise has not been fulfilled for many children who find themselves trapped in an 
educational system that cannot meet their needs. . . .  No matter how tempted 
the Court may be to intervene and attempt to ‘fix the system,’ a court is ill-
equipped for such a task.  Moreover, it does not have the authority to act 
as a super-school board or social scientist, even if it was arrogant enough to 
believe that it possessed the ability.  Thomas Cty. Branch of N.A.A.C.P., 299 
F.Supp.2d at 1367–68.
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recommendations based on perceptions of student ability and student 
grades.84  Dealing a blow to the African American plaintiffs, the court 
stated that “although ability-grouping practices may have the effect of 
creating racial imbalances within classrooms, we have consistently stated 
that ability grouping is not per se unconstitutional.”85  The court followed 
up this misguided conclusion with another when it noted that “abili-
ty-grouping programs are permissible in spite of any segregative effect 
they may have if the assignment method is not based on the present 
results of past segregation or will remedy such results through better 
educational opportunities.”86
Applying the McNeal test, the court concluded that the microsegre-
gation was not the present effect of past segregation even though 
plaintiffs presented “some statistical data suggesting that race rather 
than ability explains many of the black students’ lower placements.”87 
The court instead deferred to the district court conclusion that the teach-
er evaluation of the “lesser-perceived ability of black students was based 
upon impoverished circumstances more than anything.”88  If microseg-
regation is going to be reversed, courts must stop minimizing data on 
discriminatory practices and cease discounting microsegregation as mere 
racial imbalance without remedy.89
C. Exemplars in Lower Court Rulings
Courts should appropriate the Eastern District of Texas position 
that “[t]he existence of unconstitutional discrimination is not determined 
solely by intent, and the State is prohibited from any act abridging the 
constitutional rights of children to equal education opportunities wheth-
er attempted directly or by evasive schemes.”90  Even more profoundly, 
this court ruled that:
84 Holton II, 490 F.3d at 1259.  However, as the United States District Court, District of 
Delaware, stated, racially-neutral means should not be equated with constitutional compli-
ance.  Coal. To Save Our Children v. Buchanan, 744 F. Supp. 582, 586 (D. Del. 1990).
85 Holton II, 490 F.3d at 1262 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1263, 1261.  The court indicated that “sole cause” is not the standard but rather 
“substantial cause.”  Id. at 1263.  The court also conceded that there were “some instances in 
the record of intentional segregation.”  Yet, the court effectively discounted the importance of 
this evidence.  Id. at 1263.
88 Holton II, 490 F.3d at 1262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 The court did not address the other prong of the McNeal test.
90 United States v. State of Tex., 330 F.Supp. 235, 244 (E. D. Tex. 1971) (emphasis added).
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Quite clearly, it is unconstitutional to assign students to class-
rooms on the basis of race, and it should be equally clear 
that where the State Agency can determine from complaints, 
accreditation visits or from any other source, that such dis-
criminatory in-school assignments exist, the Agency should 
treat such practices as tantamount to discriminatory student 
assignment to schools and should act accordingly to eliminate 
such in-school discrimination wherever it is found.91
This ruling should become the prototype for other courts as it precludes 
hiding behind intent rulings to deny minorities the right to micro-deseg-
regation.  Likewise, the judiciary must declare, as the Eastern District of 
New York did, that “benign neglect is as illegal as malign intent—both 
are unconstitutional.”92
Larry P. v. Riles is another example of a case the judiciary can use 
as a standard for addressing microsegregation.93  In that case, six African 
American elementary school students brought suit against the state and 
other defendants on behalf of themselves and all African American stu-
dents in California classified or likely to be classified as educable mentally 
retarded (EMR) based on I.Q. test scores.94  The Northern District of 
California found that the EMR classes were “conceived of as dead-end 
classes.  Children are placed there, generally at about eight to ten years of 
age, because they are thought to be incapable of learning the skills incul-
cated by the regular curriculum.”95  The district court found that “even 
more than segregated schools, disproportionate enrollment of minorities 
in EMR classes stigmatizes those in the classes and serves inevitably to 
perpetuate invidious stereotypes based on the superiority or inferiority 
91 Id. at 249 (internal citations omitted) (citing Johnson v. Jackson Parish Sch. Bd., 423 F.2d 
1055 (5th Cir., 1970)); Jackson v. Marvell Sch. Dist., 425 F.2d 211 (8th Cir., 1970).  This ruling 
is profound given that there has been a paucity of judicial courage of conviction to enforce 
micro-desegregation.
92 Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, New York Sch. Dist. No. 21, 383 F. Supp. 699, 755 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
93 Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F.Supp. 926, 941–42 (N.D. Cal.1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 793 
F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94 Larry P. By Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 1984).  The EMR classes were 
designed “for schoolchildren of retarded intellectual development who are considered inca-
pable of being educated through the regular educational program, but who could benefit from 
special educational facilities to make them economically useful and socially adjusted.”  Id. at 
973.
95 Larry P., 495 F.Supp. at 941–42 (emphasis added); Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 488–89 
(9th Cir. 1994).
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of ‘racial stocks.’”96  Defendants argued that district consideration of 
parental consent in the placement process mitigated discrimination in 
the placements.97  Rejecting this argument, the court pointed out that 
“consent is rarely withheld, particularly by minorities, since the mystique 
of teacher authority and I.Q. scores tends to overwhelm parents.”98
The district court granted a permanent injunction against the defen-
dants’ use of standardized tests to identify and place African American 
students into EMR classes.99  The court harshly criticized use of the I.Q. 
tests because “the tests were never designed to eliminate cultural bias-
es against black children; it was assumed in effect that black children 
were less intelligent than whites.”100  The court additionally required the 
defendants to discontinue the disproportionate assignment of African 
American children to EMR classes.101  It is very disconcerting that defen-
dants settled into “a complacent acceptance of those disproportions, 
and that complacency was evidently built on easy but unsubstantiated 
assumptions about the incidence of retardation or at least low intelli-
gence among black children.”102  To promote accountability from the 
defendants, the district court ordered the school districts to prepare an 
annual report for inclusion in a statewide report on racial assignments 
to EMR classes.103  Any school district that had African American EMR 
enrollment of one standard deviation more than the district rate for 
White EMR enrollment was required to present a plan that would cut 
the discrepancy within three years.104  In a fatal blow to the defendants’ 
claims, the court concluded that the plaintiffs “were not retarded” and 
thus should not have been placed in EMR classes at all.105  The Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the district court conclusions.106
96 Larry P., 495 F.Supp. at 979.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 950, n.51.
99 Id. at 989.
100 Id. at 956–57.  See also id. at 955 (“the experts have from the beginning been willing to 
tolerate or even encourage tests that portray minorities, especially blacks, as intellectually 
inferior.”).
101 Larry P., 495 F.Supp. at 990.
102 Id. at 983.
103 Id. at 990.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 988; Larry P. By Lucille P., 793 F.2d at 978.
106 Larry P. By Lucille P., 793 F.2d at 972–78.  The appellate court faltered, however, in 
relying on intent as the measure of constitutional violation, id. at 984, for as discussed earlier 
in this Article, intent should not be a litmus test.  In launching an official civil rights era for 
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In Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, the Eastern District 
of Louisiana ordered micro-desegregation of the Franklinton Elemen-
tary School (Louisiana) after finding “evil” in the school’s tracking 
program.107  The court was very upset after discovering the extent of 
microsegregation:
Eighty-two percent of the white students in the system . . . were 
assigned to one of the top three sections in each grade while 
an average of 63% of all black students were assigned to the 
bottom three or four sections.  Ninety percent of the students 
assigned to lower sections (D and below) over the past two 
years are black and significant percentages of the black enroll-
ment of the school . . . have been assigned to all-black classes 
(generally the lowest two sections of each grade).108
Disgusted with the discriminatory practices, the court chastised the school 
district: “These figures reflect another evil of the ability-achievement 
homogeneous grouping as practiced in Franklinton Elementary—the 
minimal amount of fluidity within the system. . .  .   This lack of mobil-
ity tends to lock students, especially those in the bottom sections, into 
the same section throughout grammar school.  Since black students 
comprise the bulk of the lower sections, they tend to be most adverse-
ly affected by this lack of mobility.”109  As this court did, others need 
to call out microsegregation for what it is—evil that is very deleterious 
to minorities.
Orders to micro-desegregate do work even if gradually.  Where 
there is slower pace implementation, courts have to intervene to enforce 
speedy accountability as occurred, for instance, in Montgomery v. 
Starkville Municipal Separate School District.110  In that case, the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Mississippi observed that, after it 
ordered micro-desegregation, “students were reassigned and desegregat-
ed.  Facilities and educational programs were opened up to all students 
micro-desegregation, the Supreme Court should declare, as did the Montgomery district court, 
that “[i]f the results of achievement grouping are statistically abnormal, an inference of dis-
crimination may be drawn.”
Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 487, 496 (N.D. Miss. 1987), 
aff’d, 854 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1988).
107 Moses v. Wash. Parish Sch. Bd., 330 F.Supp. 1340, 1343, 1345 (E.D. La. 1969) (Moses II).
108 Id. at 1343.
109 Id. at 1343–44.
110 Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 665 F.Supp. 487 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
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regardless of color, and desegregation in the Starkville schools com-
menced.”111  The court also ordered school officials to submit biannual 
reports that would facilitate judicial monitoring of progress.112  The court 
observed that without the tracking program the classrooms would have 
reflected the proportional representations of the various races in the dis-
trict: “The student population in Starkville is roughly divided equally 
among blacks and whites.  Concededly, a random distribution of students 
would find this ratio reflected in the classrooms.  Under achievement 
grouping, however, classes involving skill mastery have a degree of racial 
identification.”113
D. Continuing Duty to Desegregate
“Segregation perpetuates the barriers between the races; stereo-
types, misunderstandings, hatred, and the inability to communicate are 
all intensified.”114  Therefore, courts must aggressively confront microseg-
regation.  As the Fifth Circuit has ruled, “[p]ublic school officials have a 
continuing duty to eliminate the system-wide effects of earlier discrim-
ination and to create a unitary school system untainted by the past.”115 
Judicial enforcement of this continuing obligation for systemwide erad-
ication should include tracking, because tracking is part of a school 
system’s policies and practices.
In interpreting and applying the Supreme Court desegregation 
jurisprudence to tracking, courts should heed the words of Chief Judge 
Lawrence of the Southern District of Georgia that “[u]nder latter-day 
Fourteenth Amendment interpretation, scholastic aptitude means noth-
ing.  Total integration of schools, regardless of consequences to the 
[school] system, [is] all that counts.”116  “The fact that in many schools 
the equivalent of token integration has been carried out is of no legal 
moment; the Constitution is not appeased by tokenism.”117
111 Id. at 490.  An Office of Civil Rights (OCR) complaint also led to the Starkville Schools 
abandoning teacher and counselor recommendations as criteria for placements due to their 
subjectivity.  Id. at 496–97.  Subsequently, the court found that the district had implemented 
better safeguards to allow reinstitution of teacher and counselor recommendations for place-
ments.  Id. at 502.
112 Montgomery, 665 F.Supp. at 491.
113 Id. at 495.
114 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401, 504–05 (D.D.C. 1967).
115 Castaneda by Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
116 United States v. Bd. of Ed. of Lincoln Cty., 301 F. Supp. 1024, 1029 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (em-
phasis added).
117 Hobson, 269 F.Supp. at 502.
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With respect to nonunitary schools, courts should adopt the Fourth 
Circuit ruling that shifts in demographics should not excuse segrega-
tion: “Until a school system has discharged its duty to liquidate the dual 
system and replace it with a unitary one, the school’s duty remains in 
place.  Until a unitary system is created, a school system is not absolved 
from this duty by reason of demographic changes.”118  In fact, in the case 
of microsegregation, courts should extend this to unitary school sys-
tems since microsegregation has not had its plenary civil rights epoch. 
A blanket order regarding racially-identifiable classrooms should be 
imposed on all schools practicing microsegregation.  This blanket order 
should state that “[a]ll classroom assignments shall be made on a racially 
non-discriminatory basis and in such a manner that no class is racial-
ly identifiable.”119  This would be a quintessential order as it would not 
rest on intent, and its aversion to racially-identifiable classrooms is 
commendable.
We have Supreme Court precedent stating that “[s]chool boards 
have the affirmative duty to take whatever steps may be necessary to 
convert to a unitary system in which discrimination is eliminated.”120  It is 
due time for courts across the country to rally to enforce this duty within 
America’s public schools to address classroom segregation.
ConClusIon And ImplICAtIons
It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we now must 
permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to 
race in making decisions about who will hold the positions of 
influence, affluence, and prestige in America.  For far too long, 
118 Vaughns by Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cty., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 
1985) (citing Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 616 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1980)).  Accord Moses 
v. Wash. Parish Sch. Bd., 330 F.Supp. 1340, 1344–45 (E.D. La. 1969) (Moses II).
119 Moses v. Washington Parish Sch. Bd., 302 F.Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1969) (Moses I). 
This United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana ruling is notable as it is an ab-
solute all-encompassing order.  Another positive order could be patterned in Justice Harlan’s 
words: “Such relief . . . should consist of an order providing measures for achieving disestab-
lishment of segregated school systems, and should, if appropriate, include provisions for pupil 
and teacher reassignments, rezoning, or any other steps necessary to accomplish the desegrega-
tion of the public school system. . . .  Such relief shall become effective immediately after the 
courts, acting with dispatch, have formulated and approved an order that will achieve complete 
disestablishment of all aspects of a segregated public school system.”  (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added).
120 Board of Educ. of Lincoln Cty., 301 F.Supp. at 1030 (emphasis added).
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the doors to those positions have been shut to Negroes.  If we 
are ever to become a fully integrated society, one in which the 
color of a person’s skin will not determine the opportunities 
available to him or her, we must be willing to take steps to 
open those doors.  I do not believe that anyone can truly look 
into America’s past and still find that a remedy for the effects 
of that past is impermissible.121
–Justice Marshall
In this vein of wisdom, we must confront as a nation the reality of 
tracking.  The reality is that tracking is hurting minority students.  The 
reality is that tracking perpetuates racial stereotypes of minority intel-
lectual inferiority.  The reality is that tracking leads to confirmation bias 
of inferiority through test scores as well as teacher and counselor recom-
mendations and expectations.  The reality is that tracking is condemning 
minority students to life sentences of poverty, limited opportunities 
and vicious cycles.  The reality is that tracking is depriving minorities of 
equal educational opportunities.  “The reality is that you can’t close the 
achievement gap until you close the curriculum gap that is created by 
tracking.  We have learned from experience that when teachers teach 
the same high-level rigorous curriculum to all students, the achievement 
gap narrows.”122
Schools should detrack into heterogeneous classrooms that use 
instructional strategies that work well with diverse students in hetero-
geneous classrooms.  Such strategies include acceleration as well as 
cooperative learning models such as small-group teaching, Jigsaw, and 
Student Teams-Achievement Divisions (STAD).123  Teachers should 
incorporate differentiated instruction models such as active processing 
activities, flexible grouping, concept maps, cue cards to scaffold learning, 
silent reading with purpose, extension activities, multiple entry points, 
individual conferences, differentiated questions, constructivist learning, 
and varied journal prompts.124  Teachers should be provided professional 
121 Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401–02 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added).
122 Carol Corbett Burris & Delia T. Garrity, Detracking for Excellence and Equity 
33 (2008).
123 See Burris & Garrity, supra note 122, at 105, 149–50 and Meier et al., supra note 5, at 
146 for more on these cooperative learning models.
124 For more on these differentiated instruction models see Burris & Garrity, supra note 
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development that teaches and coaches them how to work effectively with 
students of all races using these and other strategies in heterogeneous 
classrooms.  Professional development should also be offered to retrain 
educators and to educate them on minority cultures so as to eliminate 
the low expectations paradigm ingrained in the tracking system.  Similar-
ly, lesson plans and extracurricular activities should be designed to teach 
students to value their peers of all races and to see them as coequals.
As Jeannie Oakes found in her extensive research, “heterogeneous 
grouping, reflecting not only the full range of student achievement and 
aptitudes but also the socioeconomic and ethnic diversity of schools 
would provide more equitable educational experiences than does a 
system of tracking.”125  Indeed, detracking has been shown to improve 
student achievement—almost entirely closing the racial achievement 
gap in the Rockville Centre School District (New York), and earning 
South Side High School (New York) the Department of Education’s 
Blue Ribbon School of Excellence.126
School-community activities should be planned to bring families 
together from various racial backgrounds to foster interracial under-
standing and appreciation.  These activities should feature curricular and 
extracurricular performances by students of various races so that parents 
can be educated about the potential and intelligence of students of all 
races.127  Without this education, it would be difficult to get some parents 
to embrace detracking:
[D]etracking won’t seem logical to either teachers or par-
ents unless credible school leaders counter some deeply held 
cultural beliefs: that innate ability is more important than 
schooling, that only some students can benefit from accelerat-
ed instruction, and that beliefs must be brought into teachers’ 
work as they revise the curriculum, design lessons, and devel-
op assessments.128
122, at 93, 100–02, 104 (Figure 6.1), 105–13, 114–18, 126–28, 150, 163–65.
125 Jeannie Oakes, Keeping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality 206 (2d ed. 2005).
126 Burris & Garrity, supra note 122, at viii, 26.
127 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401, 419 (D.D.C. 1967) (“Negro and white children 
playing innocently together in the schoolyard are the primary liberating promise in a society 
imprisoned by racial consciousness.  If stereotypic racial thinking does set in, it can best be 
overcome by the reciprocal racial exposure which school integration entails.”).
128 Burris & Garrity, supra note 122, at ix.
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Community hostility to desegregation should never excuse microseg-
regation nor should it dictate the court’s willingness to condemn the 
practice.129  In the fight for micro-desegregation, more courts must take 
a resolute stand as did the Eastern District of Texas, which emphatically 
stated that “this Court remains undeterred by the opposition of popu-
lar opinion.”130  Righteousness and justice should not flinch, ripple, or 
whisper based on popular or unpopular opinion.  We agree with Jus-
tice Sotomayor that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply 
the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries 
of racial discrimination.”131  We must, without fear, guilt, derision, or 
shame, engage in racial conversations that will thwart the institutional-
ization of racism.
As the Supreme Court has ruled, “[t]he measure of any deseg-
regation plan is its effectiveness.”132  If we are to truly address racial 
injustice and racial segregation in schools, we must confront them with 
race-conscious measures.  Relying on race-neutral measures merely puts 
a Band-Aid on a gaping wound.133  “This employment of race may be 
compared to the building of a back fire as a means of containing a 
conflagration.  Skillfully done, carefully controlled, the back fire will 
work to extinguish the greater blaze and not function to increase the 
129 See United States v. State of Tex., 330 F.Supp. 235, 241 (E. D. Tex. 1971) (“Moreover, as 
has been established by the Supreme Court, community hostility to desegregation may not 
be permitted to interfere with the vindication of the constitutional right of children to receive 
equal educational opportunities.” (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
130 State of Tex., 330 F.Supp. at 241.
131 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight 
for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 572 U.S. 291, 381 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing).
132 Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Com’rs of Mobile Cty., 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).  See also United States 
v. Lawrence Cty. Sch. Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1044–45 (5th Cir. 1986) (“a federal court’s power to 
remedy segregation is not exhausted by its issuance of a decree that promises to, but does not, 
work.”).
133 See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. Louisville L. Rev. 565, 612 (2008) 
(“the suggestion that colorblind race neutrality could ensure equality simply ignores the cen-
turies of baseline inequalities that preceded the Court’s new commitment to colorblindness.”). 
See also id. at 616 (“The Court was trying to advance a race-neutral agenda, that was rooted in 
the claim that race does not matter.  However, it was trying to do so in a culture that has always 
been based on the core conviction—whether stated or unstated—that race really does matter 
a lot.”); see also Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation: All Things Are Not 
Equal, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 107, 138 (2009) (“ignoring race simply allows historical stigma 
to persist.”).
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devastation.”134  The Constitution does not require school officials 
to exhaust “every conceivable race-neutral alternative” before using 
race-conscious measures.135
Courts need to view tracking for what it is—a vestige of notions 
and assumptions that underscored historical racial segregation.  As Pro-
fessor Rush reminds us, “dominant cultures largely control children’s 
education and impose identities on all of them.”136  Tracking is a vehicle 
for the imposition of an inferior-identity complex for minorities.  More-
over, tracking helps “dominant cultures that purportedly support the 
equality of all people nevertheless define equality in ways that promote 
their privileged status.”137  If the dominant culture is truly dedicated to 
equality, then it is due season to root out microsegregation.
Abstention from desegregation reform, difficult conversations, and 
judicial engagement is not an option as classroom segregation will only 
continue to fuel racial arrogance, ignorance, discord, incivility, and dis-
trust.138  As Professor David Kirp remonstrates, “[t]hat segregated school 
districts historically offered an inferior education to black students does 
not justify maintaining such status differentials through the device of 
tracking.”139  The longevity and tradition of historical practices should 
never countenance sentencing minority students to educational and 
intellectual penitentiary.  Further, that the practices are subtle does not 
excuse overlooking or tolerating them.  The Supreme Court acknowl-
edges as much:
Yet it must be acknowledged that the potential for discrimina-
tion and racial hostility is still present in our country, and its 
134 Ho by Ho v. San Francisco, 147 F.3d 854, 864 (1998).  See also Elia V. Gallardo, Hierarchy 
and Discrimination: Tracking in Public Schools, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 74, 82 (1994) (“The 
legal system, in fact, goes beyond ignoring the injustices of tracking by asserting that stratifica-
tion mechanisms can be fair and neutral.”).
135 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339.  See Harvard Law Review, supra note 61, at 1321 
(“concepts such as ability and intelligence have been deeply shaped by racism and . . . defer-
ence to professional expertise in these areas allows discrimination to operate through neutral 
channels.”).
136 Sharon E. Rush, Identity Matters, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 909, 911–12 (2002); Kevin Brown, 
Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease, 78 
Cornell L. Rev. 1, 5–6, 11–15, 35–41 (1992).
137 Rush, supra note 136, at 912.
138 Elizabeth S. Anderson, Racial Integration as a Compelling Interest, 21 Const. Comment. 
15, 22 (2004).
139 David L. Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student 
Classification, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 705, 763 (1973).
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manifestations may emerge in new and subtle forms after the 
effects of de jure segregation have been eliminated.  It is the 
duty of the State and its subdivisions to ensure that such forc-
es do not shape or control the policies of its school systems.  
Where control lies, so too does responsibility.140
The time for patience has run out.  As Professor Willis Hawley 
admonishes, “waiting out the demise of prejudice and discrimination is 
waiting for a miracle.”141  It is time for the judiciary to earnestly rectify 
the injustice.142  The march against microsegregation must start now so 
that, very soon, the “discrimination of the type we address today will 
be an ugly feature of history that is instructive but that is behind us.”143 
To promptly ensure this, the judiciary must rethink its “decision to limit 
the ambit of the equal protection guarantee to calculated discrimination 
and thus exclude the less visible but equally harmful and more pertinent 
forms of unconscious racial aversion”144; otherwise the judiciary could be 
complicit in discrimination.145
140 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992).
141 Willis D. Hawley, The Need for a Comprehensive Multi-Year Strategic Plan for Ending 
Racial and Ethnic Discrimination: A Focus on Schools, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 145,145 (2006).
142 In fact, “all governmental agencies, whether Federal or State, and whether through their 
executive, judicial or legislative functions, must act, at all times, to guard and secure the rights 
of all the people—regardless of race, color, or national origin—to enjoy equality and justice 
under the law.”  United States v. State of Tex., 330 F.Supp. 235, 250 (E. D. Tex. 1971) (emphasis 
added).  Justice Sotomayor’s following exhortation to the judiciary is apropos to a call for judi-
cial earnestness on micro-desegregation: “As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening 
to carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away, rather 
than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society.  It is this view that works harm, by 
perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth 
that race does matter.”  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immi-
grant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 572 U.S. 291, 381 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
143 Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring).
144 Donald E. Lively, The Effectuation and Maintenance of Integrated Schools: Modern 
Problems in a Post-Desegregation Society, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 117, 125 (1987).
145 See, e.g., Spann, supra note 133, at 608 (“I have argued in the past that the Supreme 
Court’s invalidation of affirmative action plans has had the effect of freezing the advantages 
that whites have impermissibly secured over racial minorities in the distribution of societal 
resources.  When the Court permits whites to acquire resources through race-conscious dis-
crimination, but then prohibits minorities from reclaiming a share of those resources through 
race-conscious remedies, it is like enacting a law that prohibits a runner from ever overtaking 
another runner who has received an illegal head start in a race.  The current distribution of so-
cietal resources is simply built into the existing baseline, and the Court reads the Constitution 
as prohibiting race-conscious efforts to upset that baseline by redistributing those resources.” 
26
Chicanx-Latinx Law Review [37:1
Unless the Court has equivocated, deference and local control are 
“not sacrosanct” and must yield in obeisance to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.146  Courts must be willing to step in when school districts are not 
upholding justice and the rights of minorities.147  Courts should demand 
accountability from microsegregated schools by requiring such schools 
to give regular reports on the racial breakdown of students assigned to 
each classroom for every grade level.148  Compliance monitors should 
be judicially-appointed to invigilate school’s microsegregation policies 
and practices.149
Standards for assigning students to classrooms should be entirely 
reformed to avoid racially-identifiable classrooms.150  This is extremely 
important because “[n]othing in schools leaves children behind more 
systematically than tracking and ability grouping.”151  Tracking continues 
to perpetuate a dual education system through microsegregation as does 
the testing used to assign students.152  Mired in this injustice, the vicious 
(emphasis added)).  See also Robinson, supra note 1, at 792, 797–804, 809–39 (providing exam-
ples of judicial complicity).
146 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974).  Further, as the United States District Court, 
Eastern District of Louisiana, rightly observed, the “unmistakable” duty the Supreme Court 
imposes on school districts in granting local control is to abolish segregation and to exercise 
the local control on a “constitutionally valid basis.”  Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 
F.Supp. 244, 246–47 (E.D. La. 1969).  See Coal. To Save Our Children v. Buchanan, 744 F. Supp. 
582, 587 (D. Del. 1990) (“Compliance alone cannot be the basis for preventing the court from 
acting if it turns out that the remedial decrees do not achieve their goal.”).
147 State of Tex., 330 F.Supp. at 242 and Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, New York Sch. 
Dist. No. 21, 383 F. Supp. 699, 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (affirming this and stating that courts have 
broad powers when they step in to address the constitutional violations).  See also Buchanan, 
744 F.Supp. at 590 (“The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized in this case that ‘[h]
aving once found a violation, the district judge or school authorities should make every effort 
to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practi-
calities of the situation.’” (citing Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting 
Davis v. Board of Sch. Com’rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971))).
148 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana once required 
this and it is something other courts should be encouraged to embrace.  Smith v. St. Tammany 
Parish Sch. Bd., 302 F.Supp. 106, 110 (E.D. La. 1969); Moore, 304 F.Supp. at 253.
149 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California endorsed this 
approach in Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 633 F.Supp. 808, 823–25 (N.D. Ca. 1985).
150 Courts need to do this if the legislatures will not, in order to avoid continued microseg-
regation.  The United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, did just that in Car-
ter v. School Bd. of West Feliciana Parish, 569 F.Supp. 568, 572 (M.D. La. 1983) (“shall adopt 
non-discriminatory standards for the assignment of students and faculty to classrooms.”).
151 Oakes, supra note 125, at 296.  Professor Oakes came to this conclusion after several 
years of intensive and extensive tracking research.
152 Testing should not be allowed for student assignment when it furthers resegregation. 
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cycle continues from tracked parents to their tracked children; and “[b]y 
foreclosing the chance for parents to challenge ability grouping success-
fully, the courts are denying African American [and Hispanic] children 
the opportunity to attain the high quality education their parents were 
refused.”153  The analysis above shows that there is already enough 
legal foundation in the Court’s desegregation jurisprudence to enforce 
micro-desegregation.  The Court need only enforce the constitutional 
justice and righteousness in its own words explored earlier herein.  The 
Supreme Court must uphold the “affirmative responsibility” of school 
districts to ensure that “pupil assignment policies . . . are not used and do 
not serve to perpetuate or re-establish the dual school system.”154
Minority students have waited too long for the judiciary and 
school boards to act in equity in compliance with Brown155—accord-
ingly, an accelerated timeline for dismantling in-school segregation must 
be imposed and enforced.  “The later the start, the shorter the time 
allowed for transition.”156  This is no time for deliberate speed.  Micro- 
desegregation deserves its own time in the limelight.
Moses v. Wash. Parish Sch. Bd., 330 F.Supp. 1340,1345 (E.D. La. 1969) (Moses II).
153 Nelson, supra note 56, at 375.
154 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979) (Brinkman II) (citing Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460 (1979)).  See Coal. To Save Our Children v. Buchan-
an, 744 F. Supp. 582, 588 (D. Del. 1990) (“So long as the Board continues to have an affirmative 
duty to eliminate the vestiges of prior intentional segregation, it must do more than merely 
abandon its prior discriminatory purpose.” (citing Brinkman II, 443 U.S. at 538)).  See also 
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 410 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(“Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that ‘[e]ach instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill 
this affirmative duty continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (citing Penick, 
443 U.S. at 459 and Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413–14 (1977) (Brinkman I)).
155 Courts must sound an urgent clarion call, as in Diaz when the United States District 
Court, Northern District of California, stated that “the court is nevertheless mindful of its 
overriding duty to ensure effective desegregation of a school system in which plaintiffs have 
been denied their constitutional rights for over fourteen years.”  Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. 
Dist., 633 F. Supp. 808, 827 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (emphasis added).  Justice must no longer wait. 
Justice can no longer wait.
156 Lockett v. Board of Educ. of Muscogee Cty., 342 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1965), overruled 
in part by United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967); United 
States v. Bd. of Ed. of Lincoln Cty., 301 F. Supp. 1024, 1030 (S.D. Ga. 1969).

